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ABSTRACT 
 
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION:  A POLITICAL ECONOMY 
APPROACH 
 
Aslım, Erkmen Giray 
 
M.A., Department of Economics 
 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Bilin Neyapti 
 
July 2013 
 
 
This study presents a theoretical approach to analyze income and welfare 
implications of fiscal decentralization in a static closed economy model where 
political factors are taken into account. We provide two alternative Scenarios: in one 
scenario government acts like a social planner and solves optimally for the level of 
fiscal decentralization; in the other scenario government is politically oriented and 
solves for the optimal tax rate. Under both scenarios we obtain non-cooperative 
solutions resulting from the interactions of the central government with local 
governments. Comparative statics of the model provide explicit solutions which 
enable us to derive policy implications. In order to get a better and deeper insight on 
the model, we also perform calibration and simulation analyses. We observe that 
benevolent government enhances social welfare whereas Leviathan CG enhances 
efficiency, measured by effective tax collection.   
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ÖZET 
 
MALİ YERELLEŞME: POLİTİK EKONOMİ YAKLAŞIMI 
 
 
Aslım, Erkmen Giray 
 
Yüksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bölümü 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Bilin Neyapti 
 
Temmuz 2013 
 
 
 
Bu çalışmada sunulan teorik yaklaşım, mali yerelleşmenin, statik kapalı ekonomi 
modeli içerisinde, politik faktörleride göz önüne alarak, gelir ve refah etkilerini 
incelemek üzerinedir. İki alternatif senaryo sunulmaktadır; birinci senaryoda, 
hükümet sosyal planlamacı olarak davranır ve mali yerelleşme seviyesini optimal 
olarak çözer, diğer senaryoda ise hükümet politik yönelim göstermiştir ve vergi 
oranını belirler. Her iki senaryo altında da merkezi hükümetin yerel yönetimler ile 
etkileşimi sonucu, işbirliği gerçekleşmeyen sonuçlar elde edilmiştir. Modelin 
karşılaştırmalı statiklerine bağlı olarak çıkan açık sonuçlar, politika yorumlarına 
katkı sağlamıştır. Modeli daha iyi ve detaylı  anlayabilmek için kalibrasyon ve 
simülasyon analizi yapılmıştır. Yardımsever hükümetlerin sosyal refah seviyesini, 
politik yaklaşan hükümetler ise, etkin vergi toplama esasına göre verimliliği 
geliştirdiği gözlenmiştir.  
   
Anahtar Kelimeler: Mali Yerelleşme, Politik Ekonomi, Refah 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Fiscal decentralization and federalism have received more attention in the 
economics literature after the 1980s when the effectiveness of central government 
policies on decreasing poverty and stabilizing the economies were questioned. Oates' 
seminal study (1972) on centralized versus decentralized government systems 
contributed to the fiscal decentralization literature. One of the factors that 
fundamentally contributed to this recent trend of decentralization is the foundation of 
European Union (EU) which addresses the economic power allocation problem 
between the local governments and the EU.  
Fiscal decentralization (fd) can be defined as a mechanism of shifting 
institutional power from central government to both market and local jurisdictions. In 
this study, power is defined as the cluster of fiscal responsibilities in that region with 
regard to the tax collection effort and spending. Decentralization Theorem of Oates 
(1972) postulates a system (centralized versus decentralized) where public good 
provision is Pareto-efficient; transfer of power from central government to local 
governments is argued to enhance public good provision in different regions. 
In the literature we observe lots of studies considering the pros/cons of 
decentralization and centralization. Some theoretical studies use dynamic 
frameworks and some others consider static frameworks. The empirical and 
descriptive studies investigate the growth, corruption and budget deficit implications 
of fd in regard to tax competition, spillover effect and mobility. But they are 
generally inconclusive. Recent studies point out the role of structural and 
institutional factors in getting the welfare and efficiency results of fd. To my 
knowledge, in the studies using both frameworks, fd level is always considered as a 
exogenous variable. Moreover, theoretical modeling of political factors in fd models 
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is a recently developing area in the literature. Our approach is to endogenize the 
choice of fd in a static model with a political perspective.    
In our study, social planner (SP) is a welfare enhancing institution (Pigouvian 
government). When the SP chooses fiscal decentralization (fd) level optimally, tax 
effort increases with the increase in share of public spending. Our formulation of the 
central government (CG) problem with the political proximities enables us to capture 
Leviathan features as well. Local governments (LG) maximize their own utility and 
determine the tax effort in each jurisdiction. We report the results of LG – SP and LG 
– CG interaction in two plausible scenarios. Explicit solutions of both interactions 
and the partial derivatives performed in the comparative statics analysis enable us to 
derive the policy implications.  
Main motivation of this paper is to fill the gap in the literature by introducing 
a static political factor framework of fiscal decentralization model. The main 
contribution of this study to the fiscal decentralization literature is: we determine 
optimal fd level endogenously which enables us to show the changes in welfare and 
income distribution in response to the changes in fiscal variables and political 
proximity (pi) of each jurisdiction to the CG. Main findings of our study are as 
follows. We show that 
i. If there is a benevolent SP in a closed economy, optimal fd increases 
in the share of private sector (α) and decreases in the public sector 
share (β).  
ii. When there is a benevolent SP, an increase in the share of public 
sector (β) leads to higher tax effort (ai) and an increase in the private 
sector share (α) decreases the ai in a closed economy.   
iii. t is negatively related with the relative share of the private sector and 
positively related with the relative share of the public sector. 
iv. When there is a Leviathan CG, an increase in the political proximity 
(pi) leads to an increase in the tax rate (t). 
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v. When there is a Leviathan CG, an increase in either political 
proximity (pi) or fiscal decentralization level (fd) leads to a decrease 
in the tax effort (ai). 
vi. When public good provision is higher in poor regions that are 
politically close to the CG, social welfare (USP) is improved 
compared to the provision of public goods to rich jurisdictions that are 
politically close to the CG.  
vii. When CG provide public goods to a poor jurisdiction that is 
politically close, social welfare (USP) is improved compared to CG 
being politically indifferent between poor and rich jurisdictions. 
viii. When CG provide public goods to a poor jurisdiction that is 
politically close, if fd level increases this will worsen social welfare 
(USP) and income distribution. 
ix. If CG is politically indifferent between jurisdictions, social welfare 
(USP) and income distribution improves as fd increases, in contrast to 
the case of CG being politically close to the poor jurisdiction. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a 
literature survey on fiscal decentralization. Chapter 3 introduces our model. Chapter 
4 reports the solutions of our optimization problem in two scenarios. Chapter 5 
performs the comparative statics analysis. Chapter 6 provides the calibration and 
simulation results. Chapter 7 concludes. Proofs and tables are relegated to the 
Appendix. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
 
 
Public sector plays an important role in regulating economy, affecting 
allocation, redistribution and responding to societal demands. Optimum welfare in a 
country requires justly distributed income and efficient use of resource in each 
jurisdiction. In this regard, comparing costs of providing public good by the central 
and local governments is fundamental in the fiscal decentralization literature. The 
analysis of the justifications for and the consequences of decentralization have 
captured great attention from both political scientists and the economists.  
Many empirical and theoretical studies are conducted to show the 
determinants of fiscal decentralization. Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) construct a 
federalism index of 48 sample countries from 1960 to 1995. Their study underlines 
the fact that demographic factors have large and significant effects on determining 
the centralization level. They show that the level of fiscal decentralization depends 
on the constitutional structure of a country. In this regard, covariates of fiscal 
decentralization (i.e. income) may depend on the regime or the constitutional 
structure as well. However, in their limited sample size experiment, they reject the 
hypothesis that the economic and demographic effects differ by the constitutional 
structure (federal versus non-federal). They also show that decentralization increases 
with economic growth, population, and country size. They also argue that federalist 
system is highly correlated with democratization. However, in both centralization 
and decentralization cases, we observe government intervention to the market by 
means of its constitutional power.   
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Musgrave (1959) conceptualizes a free market where the government does 
not conduct any monetary and fiscal policies. In this set-up the public sector faces 
three problems; distribution, stability, and allocation. He concludes that even if there 
is a free market that operates at full employment with efficient resource allocation, 
public policies are needed to obtain optimal welfare. According to Keynes, instability 
occurs because 1) unregulated economies will not generate high and stable levels of 
output and employment; 2) excessive spending will generate inflation and 
inefficiency. In the absence of an effective government involvement, there may be 
inefficient use of resources among alternative goods and services; some activities 
may receive excessive support and others will have insufficient resource levels. 
Allocation problem is important as it also affects the redistribution of income. 1 
Oates (1972) analyzes the importance of public sector in a different 
framework. He defines the fiscal federalism concept without the constitutional and 
political structures: the allocation of expenditure and revenue collection which is 
made across different administrative government levels. Wheare (1980) investigates 
decentralization from a political perspective and defines it as the division of powers 
between the government and sub-governments. In this study we combine these two 
perspectives and define politico-economic power as the mechanism that structures 
the interactions between central and local fiscal authorities in delivering socially and 
economically desired outcomes.  
One of the key findings of Oates (1972) is that extreme cases such as unitary 
government and fully federalist government systems have more shortcomings than 
its benefits. However, federalism is thought to combine the strengths of a unitary 
government with those of decentralization. Aside from the constitutional power that 
may be given to local authorities, as economists we care about the public good and 
service provision. Federal system is highlighted as the optimal form of government 
because it facilitates the involvement of local decision makers. In contrast, a fully 
                                               
1
 For example, we can consider the government spending on constructing a new public school. This is 
a shift in resource allocation from alternative uses to educational services. This shift will generate 
income redistribution towards construction activity and to individuals who receive the educational 
services.   
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centralized government system is unable to respond to different local preferences; 
some individuals may want less public goods and services resulting in a lower tax 
rate than others. Since analyzing the optimal level of fiscal decentralization is the 
basis of this study, it is important to address the extreme cases in the perspective of 
Oates (1972).    
When compared to a fully centralized system, decentralized governments 
may have a greater capacity to maintain higher levels of output at lower prices. 
Although there is little consensus on this issue, Montinola, Qian and Weingast 
(1995) argue that China’s successful economic growth is the result of economic 
reforms regarding federalism. However, in both cases there is a central agency that 
controls the money supply by avoiding rapid monetary expansion and high inflation 
rates due to the increase in fiscal spending. Oates (1972) argues that local 
governments are highly constrained in their capacity to stimulate the aggregate level 
of economic activity in their regions. Since there is high interdependence between 
some groups of localities, it is possible that contractionary policies or negative 
shocks affecting one jurisdiction will spill over neighbor jurisdictions. It is clear that 
cyclical movements in the aggregate economic activity can be only treated by 
countercyclical policies on a national scope. However, if each local jurisdiction 
conducts countercyclical policies differently, its positive effect will be dampened by 
mobility. In this regard, under an extremely decentralized system it is very difficult 
to adopt policies that distribute income equally in a region because there will be a 
high degree of mobility to jurisdictions which possess an income-tax program similar 
to the preferences of individuals.  
Mobility is an important component of fiscal decentralization. Tiebout (1956) 
is the first to introduce a general equilibrium framework that yields a solution to the 
public good problem that best reflects the preferences of the individuals. He argues 
that a consumer (voter) has the incentive to select a community whose local 
government provides fiscal packages well suited for his preferences. If the number of 
communities are large and if there is high heterogeneity between communities then 
consumers will have a chance to fully realize their preferences by moving freely 
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across the communities. Tiebout (1956) argues that decentralized decision making 
enables optimal mixes of communities. However, Bewley (1981) criticize Tiebout 
models for neither reaching to equilibrium nor being Pareto-optimal under free 
mobility. Boadway (2001) also argues that the volume of mobility among regions is 
not sufficient enough to generate optimal communities under a competitive 
environment, even if high level mobility occurs. He states that zoning law in cities 
exist to show the unacceptable outcomes of unfettered mobility.  In particular, zoning 
law restricts the usage and development of certain geographic areas such as industrial 
production or family residential.   
On the other hand, Bloch and Zenginobuz (2011) introduce household 
mobility under Oates’ (1972) framework and indicate that centralized system is 
efficient under high mobility and high spillovers. Their baseline model assumes that 
each local government simultaneously selects their tax rates in the first stage then in 
the second stage households’ move. In this taxation game, jurisdictions are assumed 
to be symmetric; the effect of mobility on the equilibrium outcome is subject to this 
assumption. On the other hand, if two polar cases of pure public goods and local 
public goods are considered in each jurisdiction then they report that there is no 
significant effect of mobility on equilibrium values.   
Even if there is no mobility across jurisdictions there may exist a free riding 
problem. Buchanan (1968) elaborates a two agent – two good (public and private 
goods) model to create a relation between public/private good consumption, 
production and trade under different productivity capacities where individuals can 
act strategically. The aim of the study is to attain equilibrium in which demand and 
supply of both private and public good is satisfied. However, strategic behavior may 
disturb the existing equilibrium even if there is no trade. If one individual recognizes 
the interdependence that the public good introduces then each individual will try to 
hold off production and try to leave the share of cost to the other individuals (i.e. the 
free-rider behavior). 
 An important benefit of decentralization is increased competition between 
local jurisdictions in regards to public good provision under internalized spillovers. If 
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one locality adopts effective techniques to serve their citizens, neighbor jurisdictions 
will try to adopt similar production and service techniques to avoid the criticism of 
local residents. Oates (1972) argues that increased competition will result in greater 
innovations in public good provision but his derivation is subject to the assumption 
of policy uniformity across jurisdictions.  
Besley and Coate (2003) introduce spillover effects across regions through 
public good provision by defining a positive externality. They show that below a 
critical level of spillovers of public goods, fiscal decentralization dominates fiscal 
centralization in terms of social welfare. This result is shown with a static model in 
the absence of tax competition. However, Chu and Yang (2012) address the effects 
of both mobility and spillovers with a dynamic model where they consider tax 
competition. They compare the economic growth performance and social welfare of 
decentralized and centralized fiscal systems between two jurisdictions. They show 
that decentralization is more effective than centralization in terms of economic 
growth. Similar to other studies, they show that if the spillovers of public goods are 
above the critical level then centralization dominates decentralization. However, 
since higher capital mobility results in stronger tax competition, their findings imply 
that under an optimal degree of tax competition and below some critical level of 
spillovers of public goods, higher level of social welfare is achieved under a 
decentralized fiscal system. This result also shows that pursuing economic growth 
and simultaneously having social welfare may conflict with each other.   
Chu and Yang (2012) argues that a Pigouvian government (i.e. a benevolent 
government), whose welfare consists of maximizing consumer utility, assumes away 
the potential role of tax competition in constraining the public sector. This may be 
the reason that fiscal centralization is more effective than fiscal decentralization in 
terms of social welfare. When there is no tax competition, Pigouvian welfare 
maximization is likely to lead the central government to internalize externalities, 
including corruption as a result of increased public good provision.  
Epple and Nechyba (2004) analyze two cases where there are local tax and 
local expenditure spillovers under the assumption of homogenous households and a 
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Pigouvian system of local governments. They argue that when local Pigouvian 
governments inefficiently use the policy instruments then this generates an inter-
jurisdictional spillover or local expenditure creating benefits or costs to other 
localities. They consider tax on capital. Under a closed economy this will raise 
inefficiencies by creating a distortion between the price paid to capital by firms and 
the price received by capital suppliers. In the absence of a tax competition, Pigouvian 
governments would analyze the efficiency costs of raising tax revenues in terms of 
the benefits of public good provision. On the other hand, inefficiently high use of tax 
in order to finance local public goods would generate over-provision of local goods 
under a welfare maximizing Pigouvian government system. Analogous to this result, 
inter-jurisdictional spillover of local public goods will result in lower spending in 
decentralized jurisdictions. This may explain why most studies using Pigouvian 
government models concludes that fiscal centralization dominates fiscal 
decentralization in terms of social welfare.  
Wilson (1999) argues that tax competition studies show that wasteful 
competition for capital generates under provision of public goods through reduction 
in tax rates. However, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) defend that the power to tax 
does not directly imply the nature of spending. Rationalization for the government’s 
power to tax and understanding of that power sharply distinguishes by itself.   In 
particular, they argue that tax competition lowers the political abuse of taxation in 
Leviathan government systems. 
Lockwood (2006) attempts to explain fiscal decentralization with a political 
economy perspective where it is in contrast to the traditional benevolent government 
systems which are making ad-hoc assumptions on policy uniformity to enhance 
efficient decentralization levels. He argues that political economy perspective has 
little to indicate on the costs of decentralization such as coordination failures of local 
governments.2 He concludes that the consensus is weak on the benefits of fiscal 
decentralization. From the political economy viewpoint, fiscal decentralization is 
                                               
2
 Coordiantion failures are generally due to externalties. Local governments fail to internalize the tax 
and expenditure externalities or they exploit economies of scale. (Oates, 1999) 
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thought to match the preferences of local consumers and it increases the 
accountability of governments where he assumes that policy-makers may not act 
towards the interest of the voters in a jurisdiction (i.e. rent seeking politicians). He 
also indicates that the allocation of powers between the central government and the 
regional governments are made by voting in the national legislature and by 
referendum. However, this procedure is different in federal and unitary states. In 
most federal states, the allocation of powers is attained by the constitutional 
amendment which requires the approval of the majority of regions. 
Hatfield and Padrό i Miquel (2012) consider a positive political economy 
theory of partial fiscal decentralization. They show that capital poor median voter 
would favor a partial degree of decentralization since; tax competition will lower the 
level of capital taxes that increases the capital flows to jurisdictions under a federalist 
system. In this regard, the median voter wants public good provision financed by 
capital tax revenues and redistributive public good provision is observed. This 
reveals the fact that it is socially efficient to obtain a partial fiscal decentralization 
system under capital mobility and optimal taxation. Governments can both match 
with the preferences of their citizens and achieve fiscal discipline. Analogous to this 
result, fiscal decentralization model of Akin, Cevik, and Neyapti (2011) offer a 
redistribution rule showing that under hard budget, fiscal decentralization results in 
higher fiscal discipline when local governments act strategically.3 
However, under a federalist system with tax competition it is difficult to 
internalize externalities and this may result in higher budget deficits and under-
provision of local public goods in a jurisdiction. Central government can have bailout 
policies to these districts. Crivelli and Staal (2013), argue that in such cases the size 
of localities matters.4 They conclude that there is a negative correlation between the 
size of a district and CG's willingness to provide bailouts. Spillover effects that are 
internalized by local governments are introduced under matching grants system of 
the central government to achieve efficient outcomes. 
                                               
3
 In this model tax collection effort is derived based on a specific transfer rule. 
4
 Size is defined as the population. Larger regions are more costly to bailout. 
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Another reason for the under-provision of local public goods is the political 
distance of central government to a district. There are political factors that can affect 
the transfer policy or public good provision of the central government. Oates (1998) 
mentions that political pressures are effective in central government transfer policies.  
These political pressures may force a central government to support a jurisdiction 
more or less, also affecting spillovers within jurisdictions. 
 Our study presents a model where the central government maximizes its 
objective function that takes into account its political proximity of localities, or 
alternatively the social planner maximizes welfare. Hence, the current study enables 
us to compare the two contrasting views of Pigouvian and Leviathan governments.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
MODEL 
 
 
 
We analyze three agents of the economy in a static framework. Consider a 
closed economy where there are n local governments (LG), a central government 
(CG), and a social planner (SP). We introduce three agents in two different scenarios 
where in the first scenario (Scenario I) SP is assumed to be a benevolent government 
and its non-cooperative interaction with LG yields an optimal fiscal decentralization 
level (fd). SP’s welfare maximization results are also consistent with the Pigouvian 
tradition. However, in the second scenario (Scenario II) CG behaves as a Leviathan 
government which maximizes its utility by considering its political proximity of each 
jurisdiction and LGs determine the tax collection effort (ai) accordingly. Non-
cooperative interaction between LG and CG yields an optimal tax level (t). In this 
set-up we can define the SP as the institutional mechanism which maximizes the 
social welfare. However, LG and CG maximize their own utility in terms of regional 
fiscal policies. For simplicity, we assume that there are only two jurisdictions (i = 1, 
2) which can be considered as two neighbor districts. For the purpose of tractability, 
in each government’s problem we use a Cobb-Douglas type of utility function in a 
log-linear form. There is no mobility and spillovers across jurisdictions. Section 3.1, 
3.2 and 3.3 report each government’s problem and their first order conditions. 
Interpretation of the optimal solutions is reported in the comparative statics chapter.  
 
3.1 Local Government 
 
Local government (LG) maximizes its utility which is composed of private 
consumption (Ci), local government spending (GiL), and the central government 
spending (GiC) in region i. GiL depends on the tax collection of LG in region i which 
is given by  
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                                                          GiL = fdaitYi                            (1) 
  
where fd is the fiscal decentralization level, ai is defined as the relative tax 
effort, t is the tax rate, and  Yi is the ex-ante total income in region i. 
GiC depends on the distribution of tax revenues by the share of the weighted 
political proximity 












∑
=
n
1i
i
i
p
p
 where 0 ≤  pi ≤  1. Since pi shows the political closeness 
of the CG then if pi =1, CG’s expenditures on locality i will be equal to the tax 
revenues collected by the central government. However, if pi >1 then the tax 
revenues are distributed between two jurisdictions (i = 1, 2)   by the share of pi. 
Political economy side of this study allows us to observe the changes in utility in 
terms of the political externalities faced by the jurisdictions.5  
 
                            GiC = ( )


















−
∑
∑
=
=
n
1i
i
in
1i
i
p
p
tY)fd1(                            (2) 
 
 where (1-fd) is the fiscal centralization level.  
 
Ci depends on the disposable income (YiD) of individuals. YiD of households 
is the income avaliable for consuming after the LG and CG collects their income tax 
revenues (Ti). Since Ti = fdaitYi + (1-fd)tYi then YiD and Ci equality yields: 
 
                            Ci = Yi - fdaitYi - (1-fd)tYi                                  (3) 
  
 The utility obtained from the ith jurisdiction is defined as 
 
              Ui = αlnCi + βlnGiL + βlnGiC                                                  (4)  
                                               
5
 As we mentioned in the literature survey, political corruptions are studied in terms of the changes in 
the taxation power for each jurisdiction. Chu and Yang (2012) introduce rent seeking politicians and 
interpret the possible effects by the changes in lifetime utility of politicians.  
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where Ui  is concave and increasing in Ci, GiL, and GiC.  
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Ui satisfies Inada conditions as shown below. 
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Since the households are immobile, whether the LG chooses a local public good 
level or a tax effort is irrelevant.6 The utility maximization problem of the LG in 
jurisdiction i is thus given by 
                             
a
max
i
Ui = αlnCi + βlnGiL + βlnGiC       (5)      
                   subject to  (1), (2), and (3) 
 
The solution of the LG’s optimization problem can be written in terms of the tax 
effort (ai)7: 
 
                                    ai = 





+−β+α
β 1
fd
1
t
1
fd
1
                                     
(6)
   
 
 
 
where α  is the share of private consumption, (0 < α  < 1) and β  is the share of 
government expenditures, (0 < β  < 1).  
 
 
 
 
                                               
6
 “With mobile agents, the instrument chosen by jurisdictions becomes important. A jurisdiction i can 
either choose the tax rate and let the quantity of public good adjust according to the size of the 
jurisdiction, or fix the public good level and adapt the tax rate to cover the cost of public good.” Bloch 
and Zenginobuz (2012), pg. 6 
7
 Please see the Appendix for the proof of the LG’s problem. 
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3.2 Central Government 
 
CG maximizes the total utility obtained from all jurisdictions. Utility gained 
from GiL is aggregated by the extent of political proximity (pi).   
 Total utility obtained from each jurisdiction is defined as 
 
      (7) 
 
If pi = 1, CG is indifferent between the local and central spending. Hence, 
CG’s optimization problem will yield the welfare maximizing institutional 
mechanism of a benevolent planner (SP).  
CG optimally chooses the tax rate (t). In this model, fiscal decentralization 
level (fd) and political proximity (pi) is taken as exogenous. The constraints denoted 
in LG’s problem also apply in this set-up and the problem is reported as 
 
 
t
max ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
= = = =
β+β+α=
n
1i
n
1i
n
1i
n
1i
C
i
L
iiii GlnGlnpClnU    (8)   
                                   subject to (1), (2), and (3) 
 
 where Ui is concave and increasing in Ci, GiL, and GiC. Ui also satisfies Inada 
conditions stated in the LG’s problem.  
The solution to the CG’s problem is8 
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8
 Please see the Appendix for the proof of the CG’s problem. 
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3.3 Social Planner 
 
As an alternative to the CG’s problem, SP is assumed to be a benevolent 
government who optimally chooses the level of fiscal decentralization (fd) by 
maximizing the overall social welfare 





∑
=
n
1i
iW  . In this set-up, tax rate (t) is taken 
exogenously. Overall welfare in this model is positively related with the sum of Ci, 
GiL, and GiC.  
 The welfare function is denoted as                                                                          
 
                  (10)                                               
 
Welfare maximization problem embodies the same constraints used in the 
LG’s problem and it is given by  
 
fd
max ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
= = = =
β+β+α=
n
1i
n
1i
n
1i
n
1i
C
i
L
iii GlnGlnClnW         (11) 
  
                                      subject to (1), (2), and (3) 
 
where Wi is concave and increasing in Ci, GiL, and GiC. Wi also satisfies Inada 
conditions stated in the LG’s problem. 
 
The first order condition to this problem is9 
 
        (12) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
9
 Please see the Appendix for the proof of the SP’s problem. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
MODEL SOLUTIONS 
 
 
 
4.1 SCENARIO I: LG – SP INTERACTION 
  
 In this scenario LG acts non-cooperatively with the SP; solving (6) and (12) 
simultaneously yields the optimal fiscal decentralization level (fd) and the 
corresponding tax effort (ai) in the economy. Since SP is a benevolent institution, 
political effects are not binding in the choice of optimal fd. This scenario solves for 
the optimal fd as a function of the tax rate (t), private consumption and government 
expenditure share (α, β). Lemma 1 gives the optimal outcome of the non-cooperative 
interaction in two jurisdictions. 10 
 
Lemma 1. Under the LG-SP interaction, optimal fd and ai for i=1, 2 is 
 
t)2(
t2tfd β+α
β+β+α−
=    (13)  
 
                    (14)                                                                   
 
 
where 0 < α  < 1, 0 < β  < 1, 0 < t < 1, 0 < fd < 1, and  ai  > 0 .  
  
 
 
 
                                               
10
 Please see the Appendix for the proof of  Lemma1. 
( )β+α−β
β−
==
2t
aa 21
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4.2 SCENARIO II: LG – CG INTERACTION 
  
 This scenario evaluates the non-cooperative interaction of the LG with CG. 
Solving the first order conditions of both governments yields an optimal tax rate (t). 
Under this scenario we observe the effects of political proximity on relative tax effort 
(ai) and the tax rate (t). If central government is politically close (p1 > p2) to one 
jurisdiction (i.e. i = 1) then we observe a lower tax effort in first locality and higher 
tax rate to equalize the utility from local public good provision. However, increase in 
the tax rate (t) in an economy will also lower the tax effort of the second locality. 
Hence, we observe that if p1 > p2 then tax effort is lower in all localities.  Lemma 2 
presents the optimal solutions of this simultaneous interaction.  
 
Lemma 2. Under the LG-CG interaction, optimal t and ai for i=1, 2 is 
 
2121
21
fdp - fdp - p  p  fd2 - fd2 - 2  2
pp
t βββ+β+βαβ+α
β+β
=                         (15)                        
( )
( )2121 ppfd
1fd2
aa
+
−−
==                                                                           (16)                     
 
where 0 < α  < 1, 0 < β  < 1, 0 < fd < 1, 0 < pi < 1, 0 <  t < 1 and  ai  > 0 .  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
COMPARATIVE STATICS 
 
 
 
In this part of the study we perform a comparative static analysis to examine 
the policy implications of two fiscal schemes. In this regard, we are evaluating the 
partial derivatives of optimal fiscal decentralization level (fd), tax rate (t), and 
corresponding tax efforts (ai) with respect to the model parameters: {fd, t, α , β , p1, 
p2} for both scenarios I and II. Section 5.1 presents the comparative statics for LG – 
SP optimal results and Section 5.2 reports the partial derivatives for LG – CG 
optimal solutions. In these sections we obtain unambiguous signs for each partial 
derivative. In the appendix, combined results for both scenarios are summarized 
(Table 1).  
 
5.1 Comparative Statics for LG – SP Problem 
  
The effects of the variables specified above are analyzed separately for fd and 
ai. Subsections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 report the partial derivatives for each case respectively.  
 
5.1.1 Optimal Fiscal Decentralization Level  
We will use the explicit fd solution (13) obtained in Scenario I: 
 
fd = 
t)2(
t2t
β+α
β+β+α−
    for i=1,2 
 
whose partial derivative with respect to t is 
                        
                      (17)       
( ) 02tt
fd
2 >β+α
β
=
∂
∂
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Sinceβ , α  and t are positive we observe that changes in the tax rate affect 
fiscal decentralization level positively. If the tax rate increases, utility derived from 
private sector will decrease. We observe that each locality decreases the tax effort so 
that the effective tax rate ( iτ ) declines. However, SP is a benevolent government 
who wants to increase the welfare by choosing an optimal fd level. In this regard, SP 
increases fd to equalize the welfare.  
The effect of private consumption share ( α ) in utility on fd is given by 
 
                  ( ) 02t
fd
2 >β+α
β
=
α∂
∂
                                     (18) 
 
Analogous to the case in (17) all exogenous in variables are positive therefore 
partial derivative is also positive. This result indicates that when the share of private 
consumption increases, utility gained from public provision of each jurisdiction 
increases. Therefore, SP increases the level of fd to transfer the fiscal power to 
localities.  
 
The partial derivative of fd with respect to the utility weight of government 
spending (β ) is 
 
              (19) 
 
 All of the variables are positive but due to the negative sign on the numerator, 
the relationship between the government spending share (β ) and fd is negative. This 
result is the opposite of (18). In this case, as the public sector share in the utility 
increases, households’ loss of utility from tax collection to finance the public good 
can be compensated. Therefore, fiscal decentralization level decreases accordingly.  
 
( ) 02t
fd
2 <β+α
α−
=β∂
∂
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Proposition 1. If there is a benevolent SP in a closed economy, optimal fd 
increases in the share of private sector (α) and decreases in the public sector 
share (β).  
 
5.1.2 Tax Effort 
We will evaluate the optimal tax effort (14) obtain in Scenario I. 
  
for i = 1, 2       
 
 whose partial derivative with respect to t is 
 
  
                              (20) 
 
  
In this case, the denominator and the variables are positive but the numerator 
remains negative. Hence, the partial derivative is negative. If tax rate (t) increases, 
utility gained from private consumption decreases and localities decreases the tax 
effort (ai) to maintain the same utility level.  
The effect of private consumption share in utility ( α ) on tax effort (ai) is 
 
 ( )( ) 02t
ta
2
i <β+α−β
β−
=
α∂
∂
          (21)    
    
The partial derivative of ai with respect to  α  is negative. Analogous to the 
analysis in (18), the increase in the share of private sector will result in higher public 
good provision by LG’s. Hence, this is possible when exogenously determined tax 
rate (t) increases. From the result in (20), we know that if tax rate (t) increases, tax 
effort (ai) will decrease.  
The partial derivative of ai with respect to β  is 
( )β+α−β
β−
=
2t
a i
( )
( )( ) 02tt
a
2
i <β+α−β
β+αβ−
=
∂
∂
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                  (22) 
 
Since the denominator and exogenous variables are positive, the public sector 
share (β  ) is positively affected by the tax effort (ai). This result is the opposite case 
of (21) which shows that when the share of public sector is higher, if there is a 
decrease in the tax rate (t) that increases private consumption then each jurisdiction 
increases their tax effort (ai) to compensate the utility loss from LG’s public good 
provision.  
 
Proposition 2. When there is a benevolent SP, an increase in the share of 
public sector (β) leads to higher tax effort (ai) and an increase in the private 
sector share (α) decreases the ai in a closed economy.   
 
5.2 Comparative Statics for LG – CG  Problem 
 
The effects of the model parameters on tax rate (t) and tax effort (ai) are 
analyzed separately in the subsections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. 
  
 5.2.1 Optimal Tax Rate 
We will use the explicit t solution (15) obtained in Scenario II: 
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whose partial derivative with respect to fd is 
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Since all exogenous variables are positive and ( ) 01fd 2 >−  then the effect of 
fd on t is positive. If fd increases, CG’s spending in utility decreases. CG increases 
the tax rate (t) to compensate the loss in utility. 
The effect of private consumption share in utility ( α ) on t is given by 
 
( )( )
( ) 0fdp - fdp - p  p  fd2 - fd2 - 2  2
pp2fd2t
2
2121
21 <βββ+β+βαβ+α
+−β
=
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            (24)           
  
 In this partial derivative, we observe that ( ) 02fd2 <− because 0 < fd < 1. 
Since the denominator is positive and the numerator is negative, α  and t are 
negatively related. If the weight of private sector in utility (α ) increases, CG may 
decrease the tax rate (t) to maintain higher utility from private consumption.  In this 
regard, there is also a trade-off between private consumption and public good 
provision. Since ai and t have a negative relationship, LGs may increase the tax effort 
(ai) to compensate the utility loss coming from under-provision of public good.  
Partial derivative of t with respect to β  is  
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( )( ) ( ) 01fd2pp2
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21
21 >
−+++α
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=β∂
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                                    (25) 
         
Since 0 < fd < 1,  ( )1fd −  is negative the denominator is negative. Since the 
numerator is also negative, the result is positive: if β  increases, the share of public 
sector spending in utility increases. Since ai and t has a negative relationship, an 
increase in t also increases the utility obtained from CG’s public good provision 
relative to GiL.  
Since CG gains utility from LG’s spending to the extent of its political 
proximity (pi); an increase in the weight of government spending in utility (β ) leads 
to an increase in the tax rate (t) and an increase in the private sector share in utility 
decreases the tax rate (t) in a closed economy .  
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Proposition 3. t is negatively related with the relative share of the private 
sector (α)  and positively related with the relative share of the public sector 
(β). 
 
The effect of pi on t is reported as 
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Since ( )1fd −  is negative, the denominator is also negative. Moreover, the 
numerator is negative and yielding a positive relation between t and pi. If pi increases, 
utility gain from public good provision also increases. Hence, if CG increases the tax 
rate (t) this will yield a higher utility gain from GiC.  
 
Proposition 4. When there is a Leviathan CG, an increase in the political 
proximity (pi) leads to an increase in the tax rate (t).  
 
5.2.2 Tax Effort 
We will use the optimal ai solution (16) obtained in Scenario II: 
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The partial derivative of ai with respect to fd is 
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  25 
 All exogenous variables are positive. Since the numerator is negative, the 
partial derivative is also negative. If fd increases, utility obtained from central 
government spending decreases and CG may increase the tax rate (t) to compensate 
the utility loss. However, this will lower private consumption (Ci). Therefore, LGs 
may lower their tax efforts (ai) to equalize the loss in Ci.  
 
The effect of political proximity (pi) on ai is given by 
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In this partial derivative, we observe that ( ) 02fd2 <− because 0 < fd < 1. 
Hence, the effect of pi on ai is negative. In this case, if pi increases, public sector 
spending increases and CG may increase the tax rate (t) to maximize the utility 
obtained from politically close jurisdiction. In this regard, both jurisdictions decrease 
their tax efforts (ai) to compensate the utility loss in private consumption (Ci).   
 
Proposition 5. When there is a Leviathan CG, an increase in either political 
proximity (pi) or fiscal decentralization level (fd) leads to a decrease in the 
tax effort (ai). 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
CALIBRATION AND SIMULATION ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
We obtained explicit signs for all partial derivatives of the optimal solutions. 
In order to get a better and deeper insight on the model, we also perform calibration 
and simulation analyze. Simulations and calibrations enable us to observe the 
changes in welfare (USP) and income distribution (YiDist) in response to different 
fiscal decentralization (fd), political polarization 





2
1
p
p
, ex-ante income (Yi) and tax 
rate (t) levels. In this set-up, ex-post total income (YiP) is endogenously determined 
after CG chooses its spending in regard of the weighted political proximity

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Income distribution 






=
i
P
i
i Y
YDistY shows the changes in income between YiP and 
exogenously given Yi.  
Section 6.1 reports the calibrated model variables and parameters. The results 
of all calibrations are reported in Appendix. Section 6.2 reports the simulation 
analysis under the range of values assigned to the model parameters and exogenous 
variables. The values used in both sections satisfy all assumptions denoted in our 
model.    
                                               
11
 In ex-post total income (YiP) definition, we can observe the political effect coming from GiC.  (i.e. 
YiP = Ci + GiL + GiC) 
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6.1 Calibration Analysis 
 We analyze five cases for two scenarios in terms of the calibrated parameters 
and exogenous variables. First two cases (Case I, II) report the differences in social 
welfare (USP) and YiDist regarding the changes in ex-ante total income in region i 
(Yi). Third case (Case III) is defined to compare Case II results under different 
political proximities. Case IV and Case V differ from the first two cases in regard to 
fd and t.  
In Case I we define first region (i = 1) as rich (Y1 > Y2) but politically distant 
to the CG and second region (i = 2) is poor but politically close. In Case II, first 
region (i = 1) is poor and politically distant but second region (i = 2) is rich and 
politically close. If we compare Case I with Case II; for both cases, social welfare is 
higher and equalized for each locality in Scenario I because SP is a benevolent 
government who maximizes the welfare (USP) of each jurisdiction regardless of their 
political view. However, the income distribution (YiDist) is better in Case I because 
changes in ex-post total income (YiP) in Case I is higher than Case II. When we 
compare USP and YiDist changes in Scenario II for both cases; we observe that USP 
and YiDist are higher in first case. Since CG support poor region in first case, 
welfare and YiP is improve much more than in the second case.  
 
Proposition 6. When public good provision is higher in poor regions that are 
politically close to the CG, social welfare (USP) is improved compared to the 
provision of public goods to rich jurisdictions that are politically close to the 
CG.  
 
If we analyze Case III, CG is indifferent between rich and poor jurisdictions 
in terms of political proximity. In this case, both scenarios report higher social 
welfare (USP) and income distribution (YiDist) compared to Case II. However, 
Scenario I still dominates Scenario II in terms of USP and YiDist. Among three cases, 
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the highest social welfare and income distribution for Scenario II is observed in Case 
I.  
 
Proposition 7. When CG provide public goods to a poor jurisdiction that is 
politically close, social welfare (USP) is improved compared to CG being 
politically indifferent between poor and rich jurisdictions. 
 
In Case IV, we analyze with different fd levels of Case I. Welfare and income 
distribution do not change in Scenario I. In Scenario II, increasing the fd level 
worsens welfare and income distribution.  
 
Proposition 8. When CG provide public goods to a poor jurisdiction that is 
politically close, if fd level increases this will worsen social welfare (USP) 
and income distribution.  
 
In Case V we analyze revised Case III with a different fd level where the CG 
is politically indifferent between jurisdictions. In both scenarios of Case V, an 
increase in fd level does not change the welfare and income distribution compared to 
Case III. However, if we compare Case IV with Case V; in both scenarios welfare 
and income distribution in Case V dominates Case IV.  
 
Proposition 9. If CG is politically indifferent between jurisdictions, social 
welfare (USP) and income distribution improves as fd increases, in contrast to 
the case of CG being politically close to the poor jurisdiction.  
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6.2 Simulation Analysis 
We perform a simulation analysis for Scenario I and Scenario II. We report 
the changes in welfare in response to the changes in fiscal decentralization level (fd) 
and tax rate (t) in both scenarios. The following are the range of values for model 
parameters 
[ ]1:0p1 ∈ , [ ]1:0p2 ∈ , [ ]1:0∈α , [ ]1:0∈β ,  
[ ]*1:0t ∈ , [ ] **1:0fd ∈ , [ ]5:0x ∈ , Y2 = 10 
*: used only in Scenario I, **: used only in Scenario II 
where Y1 = xY2.  
 
For Scenario I; we can observe that when 0.6 < fd < 0.7 and t = 1, social 
welfare attains its highest value.  
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For Scenario II; independent of fd level when lower than 0.4, if t is around 
0.3, we report the highest social welfare.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
  
 This study presents a theoretical approach to analyze the income and 
welfare implications of fiscal decentralization in response to the changes in fiscal 
variables and political proximity (pi) of each jurisdiction to the central authority. 
Fiscal decentralization is defined as the politico-economic power which is a 
mechanism that structures the interactions between the central and local fiscal 
authorities in delivering socially and economically desired outcomes. In one of the 
scenarios, fiscal decentralization level is chosen optimally by the SP. Our model 
presents an alternative scenario where the central government choosing the tax level, 
given a level of fd. 
All of the partial derivatives in our comparative statics analysis give explicit 
solutions which enable us to derive policy implications. In order to get a better and 
deeper insight on the model, we also perform calibration and simulation analysis. 
Main results of the proposed fiscal institutional design show that a benevolent 
government always enhances higher social welfare and income distribution levels 
compared to a Leviathan government system. Efficiency, measured by local tax 
collection efficiency, however, is greater under the Leviathan government. We also 
observe that given a fiscal decentralization level, political proximity is the key factor 
to analyze the changes in social welfare and income distribution between 
jurisdictions. We show that when CG provides public goods to a poor jurisdiction 
that is politically close, social welfare and income distribution improves compared to 
other cases.  
Further modifications of the model will be made by introducing spillovers 
across jurisdictions and heterogenizing the tax efforts of each jurisdiction. Another 
remark on the potential extensions of this paper is: introducing a dynamic framework 
which shows the changes in economic growth in response to the changes in political 
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proximity. Nonetheless, we hope that our simple framework may serve well as a 
useful first approximation of determining fiscal decentralization level endogenously 
by the essence of political factors.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Index of Variables 
 
Ci: Private consumption in region i, (Ci > 0). 
GiL: Local government spending in region i, (GiL > 0). 
GiC: Central government spending in region i, (GiC > 0). 
Yi: Ex-ante total income in region i, (Yi  > 0). 
YiP: Ex-post total income in region i, (YiP  > 0). 
YiD: Disposable income in region i, (YiD  > 0). 
Ti: Income tax revenues collected by the LG and the CG in region i, (Ti  > 0). 
t: Tax rate determined optimally by CG, (0 < t < 1).  
τi: Effective tax rate in region i, (τi < 1). 
ai: Relative tax collection effort in region i, (ai > 0). 
pi: Political proximity for region i, (0 < pi < 1). 
fd: Fiscal decentralization level which is chosen optimally by the SP,  (0 ≤  fd ≤  
1). 
Wi (USP): Welfare in region i, ( -∞ < Wi < + ∞ ). 
Ui (ULG, UCG): Utility obtained from region i, ( - ∞ < Ui < + ∞ ). 
α : Utility weight of private consumption, (0 < α  < 1).  
      β : Utility weight of government expenditure, (0 < β  < 1). 
      YiDist: Income distribution which shows the changes in 
i
p
i
Y
Y
, (YiDist  > 0). 
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Proof of LG’s First Order Condition (FOC): 
 
Substituting (1), (2), and (3) in (5) converts the problem into an unconstrained 
optimization as denoted below.  
a
max
i
Ui = αln(Yi - fdaitYi - (1-fd)tYi) + βln(fdaitYi) + βln ( )
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
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β
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

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

+− 1
fd
1
fdt
1
.  
Hence, for each jurisdiction (i = 1, 2) we have the same tax effort (a1 = a2).  
 
Proof of CG’s FOC: 
 
Substituting (1), (2), and (3)  in (6) yields an unconstrained optimization reported as 
∑ ∑ ∑
∑
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If we have two jurisdictions then explicit solution is defined as 
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Proof of SP’s FOC: 
Substituting (1), (2), and (3)  in (10) converts the model into an unconstrained 
optimization given by 
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We can simplify this explicit solution for two jurisdictions and it is reported as 
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Proof of Lemma 1: 
Given two jurisdictions, substituting (6) in (12) yields 
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To obtain the corresponding optimal tax effort (ai), we are substituting (13) in (6) and 
this is given by  
 
  40 
β+α
β
=ia
( ) ( )
( )






+β+α+β−
β+α
−β+α+β−
β+α
β+α
β
=














+
β+α
β+α+β−−






β+α
β+α+β− 1t2t
t2
t2t
21
t2
t2t
1
t
t2
t2t
1
 
 
( ) 




β+α−β
β+α+β−β−α−β+α
β+α
β
=
2t
t2tt2t2
a i  
 
Since efforts are same for each locality, we will have 
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Proof of Lemma 1: 
Given two jurisdictions, substituting (6) in (9) yields 
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When we evaluate LHS + RHS = 0, all of the ( )β+α ’s cancel out and it is reported 
under the common parenthesis of the tax rate (t) as 
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Substituting (9) in (6) gives the corresponding tax effort (ai) in two jurisdictions 
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Since efforts are same for each jurisdiction, we will have 
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Comparative Statics Table, (Table 1): 
 
If a derivative of a variable does not exist then it is denoted with dots (..) in the table 
reported below. 
t
a i
∂
∂
 denoted in the LG – CG problem is obtained from (6). 
Similarly, 
fd
a i
∂
∂
 denoted in the LG – SP problem is also obtained from (6). 
 
 
  Partial derivatives with respect to:   
    fd t a b p1 p2 
LG - CG  Problem:     
 
       
 
 
 
 
+ .. - + + + 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
- - ..   .. - - 
 
       
LG - SP  Problem:      
 
       
 
 
 
 
.. + + - .. .. 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
- - - + .. .. 
 
 
t∂
ia∂
fd∂
ia∂
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CALIBRATION TABLES 
 
 
 
  TABLE 2  
 
 
 CASE I CASE II CASE III 
              
α 0,7   0,7   0,7   
β 0,3   0,3   0,3   
p1 0,2   0,2   0,5   
p2 0,7   0,7   0,5   
Y1 20   10   10   
Y2 10   20   20   
  Scenario:   Scenario:   Scenario:   
  
I II I II I II 
fd 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 
t 0,46 0,24 0,46 0,24 0,46 0,26 
ai 1,01 2,22 1,01 2,22 1,01 2,00 
  
            
C1 10,77 12,33 5,38 6,17 5,38 6,09 
C2 5,38 6,17 10,77 12,33 10,77 12,17 
G1L 4,62 5,29 2,31 2,64 2,38 2,61 
G2L 2,31 2,64 4,62 5,29 4,62 5,22 
G1C 1,54 0,79 1,54 0,79 3,46 1,96 
G2C 5,38 2,78 5,38 2,78 3,46 1,96 
  
            
UCG 3,74 3,57 3,85 3,53 3,94 4,20 
ULG 2,25 2,19 1,56 1,50 1,80 1,75 
USP 4,19 4,06 4,19 3,42 4,30 3,81 
Y1post 16,92 18,41 9,23 9,60 11,15 10,65 
Y2post 13,08 11,59 20,77 20,40 18,85 19,35 
YDist(post/pre) 0,65 0,79 1,12 1,06 0,84 0,91 
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                  TABLE 3 
 
 
  CASE IV   CASE V 
         
α 0,7   0,7   
β 0,3   0,3   
p1 0,2   0,5   
p2 0,7   0,5   
Y1 20   10   
Y2 10   20   
   Scenario:   Scenario:   
  
I II I II 
fd 0,70 0,70 0,70 0,70 
t 0,77 0,40 0,77 0,43 
ai 0,43 0,96  0,43 0,86 
  
       
C1 10,77 12,33 5,38 6,09 
C2 5,38 6,17 10,77 12,17 
G1L 4,62 5,29 2,31 2,61 
G2L 2,31 2,64 4,62 5,22 
G1C 1,54 0,79 3,46 1,96 
G2C 5,38 2,78 3,46 1,96 
  
       
UCG 3,74 3,57 3,94 4,20 
ULG 2,25 2,19 1,80 1,75 
USP 4,19 3,57 4,30 3,81 
Y1post 16,92 18,41 11,15 10,65 
Y2post 13,08 11,59 18,85 19,35 
YDist(post/pre) 1,55 1,27 0,84 0,91 
 
